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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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between large sections of the Polish population and the Russian troops.55
By this statement alone, the Prime Minister was revealing beyond a
question of a doubt, that the Russian troops were not after all u bringing
freedom to Poland " as he had emphasised but a short time previously,
for in such an event there would surely have been no need for any of this
dread of the Red Army or the fear that they might encounter weapons
instead of a friendly reception.   The sources of information at the dis-
posal of the British Prime Minister were such that there could be no doubt
but that he was in possession of evidence which led him to speak in this
strain.   He was anticipating that c'fierce quarrels could break out between
great sections of the Polish people and the Russian troops/' thereby con-
firming that there were5 in fact5 no followers of Marshal Stalin in Poland,
and that the behaviour of " great sections of the Polish people " depended
upon the orders from their Government in London.    What Churchill
did not, however, wish to foresee was that the Polish Home Army would
support the Russian advance as they did., or that the Russian's answer
was again to be the extermination of every detachment of that Army
which they encountered^ and the persecution of all those whom they
could capture.   And that to further this aim.> the N.K.VJD. would or-
ganise the greatest of man-hunts for the Authorities and soldiers of this
Home Army.
The British Prime Minister's speech contained many fulsome compli-
ments levelled at the Polish people., combined with words of sympathy
and a great deal of advice on how to c surrender/ but . . . the bare bones
of the Polish problem had only been partially dug up and rattled at the
audience. One hundred and fifty years before, one of the greatest
politicians of the times, Charles J. Fox, had given a review of similar
speeches made in the same House of Commons. " If we saw the rights
of Poland/' he had proclaimed, " of a neutral and independent nation,
openly trampled upon, its territory invaded and all this for the manifest
aggrandisement of other Powers, and no war declared or menaced, not
even a remonstrance interposed . . . could we be blamed for suspecting
that the pretended was not the real object of the present war ? "*
The British Prime Minister was to only gradually reveal the truth of
the resolutions concerning Poland agreed upon at Teheran. A quarter
of a centuiy before, Churchill as the spiritus movens of armed intervention
in Russia for the benefit of Tsardom, had e laboured and striven ' to pre-
vent Poland arriving at an agreement with the Soviets; he was now with
equal zeal endeavouring to compel the Polish Government to accept a
fatal course of appeasement.f
* February 18, 1793.
f . . . if the Poles make a separate and precipitate peace with the Bolsheviks,
the Bolshevik Army opposite the Polish front, which is the third strongest Bolshevik
army now in the field, could swiftly be transferred to the attack of Denikin j and
this might fundamentally jeopardize his continued existence* For us to encourage